Why Beef Prices are Heading Higher

Bonddad recently wrote about a Bloomberg article on rising beef prices. My quibble isn't with his technical analysis, but with one of his comments. He thought that demand was increasing for beef because...

...as the world's standard of loving [sic] increases (think India and China making more and more money) people will want better things like steak.

Now, generally speaking, what he said is true; as people's incomes rise, we do want goods that are better than what we had before. In economics, we call these "normal goods." A normal good is any good for which demand increases when income increases. A car is an example of a normal good. All things being equal, what would you rather do if your income increases, continue taking the bus or train to work or buy a new car? Of course, you'd buy the new car. (Conversely, an "inferior good" is a good that decreases in demand as income rises; an example for the US being ramen noodles.) Anyhoo, Bonddad is suggesting that because incomes are rising in countries like India and China, they want to eat better foods such as American steak. However, the truth is that beef exports to other countries isn't the reason.

In 2006, the US exported a total of 1.145 billion pounds of beef out of a total supply of 29.912 billion pounds, which comes to 3.83%. So a little under 4% of all US beef available in the country was exported. In 2007, the percentage was 4.74%, in 2008 total beef exports is projected to be 5.44%, and for 2009, 6.21%. [All of these numbers and the following data come from the US Department of Agriculture's monthly report, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, for April and May 2008.] So, beef exports are increasing, but very slowly. Rising beef exports out of the total available for sale in the US will cause domestic beef prices to rise, but not by that much. Let's look at the more likely culprit.

American cattle are normally either grass-fed or corn-fed. Per Wikipedia, "In the United States, cattle in concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) are typically fed corn, soy and other types of feed that can include "by-product feedstuff." As a high-starch, high-energy food, corn decreases the time to fatten cattle and increases yield from dairy cattle." Per a 2003 Colorado State University study, "80% of consumers in the Denver-Colorado area preferred the taste of United States corn-fed beef to Australian grass-fed beef." And so a very significant portion of America's annual corn crop goes to feed cattle, and the price of corn has been rising dramatically, like other agricultural products, such as rice. Just how much corn is being used to feed cattle?

In 2005/6, the US had a total supply of 13.237 billion bushels of corn. Of that amount 6.155 billion bushels (46.50%) were used as "feed and residual," 2.981 billion bushels (22.52%) were used as "food, seed and industrial," and 2.134 billion bushels (16.12%) were exported. The remainder (1.967 billion bushels, 14.86%) was "closing stock" and used in the following year, 2006/7. Now, looking at these individual categories, we see that "feed and residual" was 44.73% in 2006/7 and is estimated to be 42.73% in 2007/8 and 39.19% in 2008/9. Clearly, "feed and residual" isn't a problem. Likewise, exports aren't a significant cause of corn inflation either: 16.98% of all US corn was exported in 2006/7, and 17.37% and 15.53% is expected to be exported in 2007/8 and 2008/9, respectively. Which leads to "food, seed and industrial."

The first two of these should be self-explanatory. It's the industrial that we're concerned with. The industrial use of corn comes primarily in the form of ethanol. You know, the alcohol addititive to your gasoline so that you wouldn't pay as much money (you hoped) to run your car? Turns out that ethanol is bringing up the price of corn. The USDA breaks out the amount of corn that's used in the production of ethanol, which is very helpful for our analysis. In 2005/6, corn used for ethanol made up 1.603 billion bushels out of the 2.981 billion bushels mentioned above (the remainder was presumably used for food and seed). Which means that that 1.603 billion bushels made up 12.11% of the total American corn supply. In 2006/7, that percentage increased to 16.92%, and is expected to increase to 20.84% and 29.58% in 2007/8 and 2008/9, respectively. That's where the corn's going! So, let's connect the dots.

Because Americans prefer corn-fed cattle over grass-fed, cattle producers feed them lots of corn and other grains that, in turn, help them to fatten up quicker before they're slaughtered. Still, it takes feedlot cattle 14-18 months before they are killed, which means they eat a lot of corn. (I don't know exactly how much an average cow eats in its lifetime. No doubt the farmers do.) Because the price of corn has been going up ($2.00 per bushel in 2005/6 to $3.04 per bushel in 2006/7), it costs the cattle producer that much more to feed a cow until it gets to its terminal weight. Which means that cattle producers are actually losing money now for every cow they sell. According to the Bloomberg article, the feedlots were losing $139.56 a head in April, up from a record loss of $169.80 a head in March, and down from a profit of $46.79 a head in April 2007. No doubt there are some other factors that probably have affected the price increases for corn (oil and fertilizers come to mind), but the primary cause of the price increases in beef appears to be due to the increases in the price of corn. Which, no doubt, must be a relief to the Indians and Chinese, who don't tend to eat beef anyway; the former tend to eat mutton and chicken, the latter pork.

James Hamilton: Oil Price Fundamentals

James Hamilton at Econbrowser looks at the question of what's been driving oil prices higher, market fundamentals or speculation? I've got some additional comments down below.

The developed economies consume a disproportionate share of the world's energy, with North America and Europe accounting for about half of the total oil use in 2006. However, it is the newly industrialized countries and oil producers that account for the recent rapid growth in demand, with Asia and the Middle East accounting for 60% of the increase in petroleum use between 2003 and 2006. North America and Europe contributed only 1/5 of the growth.

Particularly dramatic in this growth has been China, whose petroleum consumption between 1990 and 2006 increased at a 7.2% annual compound rate. It's always amusing to project these impressive exponential growth rates. If that rate of growth were to continue, China would be using 20 million barrels a day by 2020, about as much as the U.S. is today. By 2030, China would be up to 40 mb/d, twice the current U.S. consumption.

Are such projections plausible from the point of view of potential demand? During 2006, China used about 2 barrels of oil per person. For comparison, Mexico used 6.6-- Chinese oil consumption could triple and they'd still be using less per person than Mexico is today. The U.S. used almost 25 barrels per person. According to the data collected for a new research paper by Max Auffhammer and Richard Carson, there were 3.3 passenger vehicles per 100 Chinese residents in 2006, compared with 77 in the United States. Yes, I would say that these astonishing numbers for potential future Chinese oil demand are not at all inconceivable.

...

I do think there are prospects for a significant boost to world petroleum production this year, thanks to a number of big new projects scheduled to begin production. The Wikipedia database reports 7 mb/d in eventual gross new production capacity eventually expected from projects that are supposed to begin producing during the current calendar year. Before you get too excited about that number, however, several cautions are in order. First, 7 mb/d refers to the eventual peak production, not the amount that can be produced this year. Second, there is inevitably some slippage and delays. For example, the list includes 250,000 b/d from Thunder Horse, BP's Gulf of Mexico project that was initially hoped to start giving us oil in 2005, but is still undergoing repair work. Third, the above tabulation refers to gross new capacity, much of which is needed to replace declining production currently being observed in the world's mature producing fields. At any point in time, some of the world's producing fields are well into decline, some are at plateau production, and others are on the way up. It is not clear what average decline rate is appropriate to apply to aggregate global production, but a plausible ballpark number might be 4%. That would mean that in the absence of new projects, global production would decline by 3.4 mb/d each year. To put it another way, a new producing area equivalent to current annual production from Iran (OPEC's second biggest producer) needs to be brought on line every year just to keep global production from falling. Of the 7mb/d in gross new capacity from the projects tabulated above, projects in Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Mexico account for about a third of this gross increase. Data currently available for the first two months of 2008 show actual production in Saudi Arabia down 350,000 b/d from its average 2005 value, though the latest news suggests that Saudi production may be close to returning to 2005 levels. Mexican production is currently down 400,000 b/d from 2005, and Russian production is down 100,000 b/d from its average level in the second half of 2007.

To summarize, I think we will see some net production gains this year, and expect this to bring some relief for oil prices. But I cannot imagine that the projected path for China above will ever become a reality. Oil prices have to rise to whatever value it takes to prevent that from happening.

So yes, I do believe that speculation has played a role in the oil price increases, particularly what we've observed the last few months. But it's a big mistake to conclude that speculation is the most important part of the longer run trend we've been seeing.

I've been studying petroleum consumption for a number of months now, and have done my own forecast for China through the year 2012 (a five-year forecast). Although I haven't had the chance to post the executive summary of my Northeast Asia forecast here, China's petroleum consumption rate on a per-capita basis is very, very small. Hamilton said that China "used about 2 barrels of oil per person" in 2006, but the actual number is 1.0256 barrels per person. Likewise, petroleum consumption on a per capita basis has been very weak as well. The Chinese compound annual growth rate between 1985 and 2006 was 1.86% per year. I'm forecasting a per capita growth rate of 0.61% to 0.88% for the period between 2006 and 2012. Of course, aggregate consumption growth rates should be somewhat higher but, at current consumption growth rates, it will take decades for China to reach Mexico's consumption level, let alone the U.S.'s level. (To be honest, I don't think that China will ever get that far; I suspect most oil worldwide would be gone before China could get up to the U.S.'s level of gluttony.)

Overall, though, I agree with Hamilton's analysis; I think oil prices are primarily driven by market fundamentals. There probably is some speculation at work here (as there is for commodity prices), but I think a relatively stable level of supply and an ever increasing level of demand are the primary factors bringing oil prices higher.

Jeffrey D. Sachs: Surging Food Prices Mean Global Instability

Quite by coincidence, I came across the following article in Scientific American just a short time after publishing my last post. This article, by Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, focuses primarily on one of the root causes of the current food crisis, the conversion of maize ("corn" to us Americans) into ethanol. One of the good things about this article is that four recommendations are given; the first of which ties in very well with the food sovereignty idea/Malawi case study mentioned in my previous post.

While you're at it, you should also read Angry Bear's The Biofuel-Backlash Backlash and Econbrowser's Reconciling Estimates: Biofuels and Food Prices.

The recent surge in world food prices is already creating havoc in poor countries, and worse is to come. Food riots are spreading across Africa, though many are unreported in the international press. Moreover, the surge in wheat, maize and rice prices seen on commodities markets have not yet fully percolated into the shops and stalls of the poor countries or the budgets of relief organizations. Nor has the budget crunch facing relief organizations such as the World Food Program, which must buy food in world markets, been fully felt. The results could be calamitous unless offsetting policy actions are taken rapidly.

The facts are stark. A metric ton of wheat cost around $375 on the commodity exchanges in early 2006. In March 2008, it stood at over $900. Maize has gone from around $250 to $560 in the same period. Rice prices have also soared. The physical inventories of grain relative to demand are also down sharply in recent years.

Several factors are at play in the skyrocketing prices, reflecting both rising global demand and falling supplies of food grains. World incomes have been rising at around 5 percent annually in recent years, and 4 percent in per capita terms, leading to an increased global demand for food and for meat as a share of the diet. China’s economic growth, of course, has been double the world’s average. The rising demand for meat exacerbates the pressures on grain and oil-seed prices since several kilograms of animal feed are required to produce each kilogram of meat.

Feed grains have risen from around 30 percent of total global grain production to around 40 percent today. Land that would otherwise be planted to the main grains is shifting to soya bean and other oil seeds used for animal feed. It is forecast, for example, that U.S. farmers will cut maize plantings by 8 million acres, while raising soya-bean production by about the same amount. The grain supply side has also been disrupted by climate shocks, such as Australia’s massive droughts.

An even bigger blow has been the U.S. decision to subsidize conversion of maize into ethanol to blend with gasoline. This wrong-headed policy, pushed by an aggressive farm lobby, gives a 51-cent tax credit for each gallon of ethanol blended into gasoline. The 2005 Energy Policy Act mandates a minimum of 7.5 billion gallons of domestic renewable-fuel production, which will overwhelmingly be corn-based ethanol, by 2012. Consequently, up to a third of the U.S. mid-Western maize crop this year will be converted to ethanol, causing a cascade of price increases across the food chain. (Worse, use of ethanol instead of gasoline does little to reduce net carbon emissions once the energy-intensive full cycle of ethanol production-- including the energy-intensive fertilizer and transport needs --is taken into account.)

The food price increases are pummeling poor food-importing regions, with Africa by far the hardest hit. Several countries, such as Egypt, India and Vietnam, have cut off their rice exports in response to soaring prices at home, thereby exacerbating the effects on rice-importing countries. Even small changes in food prices can push the poor into hunger and destitution: as famously expounded by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, some of the greatest famines in history were caused not by massive declines in grain production but rather by losses in the purchasing power of the poor.

At a time when hundreds of billions of dollars each year veer to war rather than peaceful development, and when media attention is riveted on the U.S. financial crises, it is hard to raise even a few billion dollars for desperately hungry people. Still, it is urgent to do so. At least four measures should be taken in response to soaring food prices.

First, the world should heed the call of U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to fund a massive increase in Africa’s own food production. The needed technologies are available—high-yield seeds, fertilizer, small-scale irrigation—but the financing is not. The new African Green Revolution would initially subsidize peasant farmers’ access to high-yield technologies and thereby at least double grain yields. The funding would also help farm communities establish long-term micro-finance institutions to ensure continued access to improved agricultural inputs after the temporary subsidies are ended in a few years.

Second, the U.S. should end its misguided corn-to-ethanol subsidies. Farmers hardly need them given world demand for food and feed grains. There is certainly a case for re-doubling the scientific efforts to produce bio-fuels on lands which do not compete with food crops, for example from cellulosic ethanol, but this technology is still not ready for the market.

Third, the world should support longer-term research into higher agricultural production. Shockingly, the Bush administration is proposing to cut sharply the U.S. funding for tropical agriculture research in the Consultative Group for International Agriculture Research (CGIAR), just when that research is most urgently needed. This is an example of the Administration’s anti-scientific approach at its worst.

Finally, the world should follow through on the promised Climate Adaptation Fund announced last December in the Bali Climate Change conference, to help poor countries face the growing risks to food production from increasingly adverse climate conditions. Even as the world staunches the immediate crisis, there will be more wrenching dislocations as drought, heat stress, pest infestations and other climate-induced shocks occur increasingly often.

HT: Economist's View

Walden Bello: Manufacturing a Food Crisis

In reading this important article by Walden Bello in The Nation, one wonders who the people at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) really are: dogmatic eggheads who blindly follow the "free trade" mantra without regard to the human consequences, or useful fools working on behalf of rich northern nations and corporations? Perhaps both. Bello shows that, since the early 80s, the World Bank, IMF, WTO and free trade agreements like NAFTA have caused several nations (Mexico and the Philippines are given as examples) to go from being net exporters of food to net importers, largely as a result of World Bank and IMF policies that helped keep several governments solvent but at the expense of ruining local farmers. The countries were forced to accept highly subsidized food imports from the U.S. and the European Union or, in the case of Malawi, to sell off their food reserves in return for loans. In the meantime, more and more farmers are committing suicide (especially in India) as their livelihoods are ruined, and about 1,500 Malawians died from starvation when a famine struck that country in 2001-02, when little food was available because the country had been forced (earlier) to sell their food reserves. (One wonders whether the IMF and the other NGOs realize how much blood is on their hands.) The case of Malawi is particularly rich with irony considering that the World Bank forced the Malawian government to scrap a subsidy program for its farmers (which had been very successful, bringing in a bumper crop of corn), because "the subsidy distorted trade." And, yet, "[s]ince the late 1990s subsidies have accounted for 40 percent of the value of agricultural production in the European Union and 25 percent in the United States." What hypocrisy.

There is nothing wrong with international trade; we all benefit by it. But "free" trade often isn't free and can carry an extremely heavy cost. Trade, like anything else, needs to be regulated if it is to work most effectively. Obviously the human costs, in terms of suffering and needless deaths, are factors that need to be considered, but aren't. The suggestion of "food sovereignty," mentioned at the bottom of the article, makes sense. We need to realize that most of these farmers in Mexico, the Philippines, and around the world are among the poorest of the poor who, like everyone else, need to be able to support themselves and their families. Poor national governments need to weigh more carefully the demands of debt servicing by organizations like the IMF and World Bank against the needs of their citizens who are most at risk.

Some excerpts:

However, an intriguing question escaped many observers: how on earth did Mexicans, who live in the land where corn was domesticated, become dependent on US imports in the first place?

The Mexican food crisis cannot be fully understood without taking into account the fact that in the years preceding the tortilla crisis, the homeland of corn had been converted to a corn-importing economy by “free market” policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and Washington. The process began with the early 1980s debt crisis. One of the two largest developing-country debtors, Mexico was forced to beg for money from the Bank and IMF to service its debt to international commercial banks. The quid pro quo for a multibillion-dollar bailout was what a member of the World Bank executive board described as “unprecedented thoroughgoing interventionism” designed to eliminate high tariffs, state regulations and government support institutions, which neoliberal doctrine identified as barriers to economic efficiency.

Interest payments rose from 19 percent of total government expenditures in 1982 to 57 percent in 1988, while capital expenditures dropped from an already low 19.3 percent to 4.4 percent. The contraction of government spending translated into the dismantling of state credit, government-subsidized agricultural inputs, price supports, state marketing boards and extension services. Unilateral liberalization of agricultural trade pushed by the IMF and World Bank also contributed to the destabilization of peasant producers.

This blow to peasant agriculture was followed by an even larger one in 1994, when the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect. Although NAFTA had a fifteen-year phaseout of tariff protection for agricultural products, including corn, highly subsidized US corn quickly flooded in, reducing prices by half and plunging the corn sector into chronic crisis. Largely as a result of this agreement, Mexico’s status as a net food importer has now been firmly established.

With the shutting down of the state marketing agency for corn, distribution of US corn imports and Mexican grain has come to be monopolized by a few transnational traders, like US-owned Cargill and partly US-owned Maseca, operating on both sides of the border. This has given them tremendous power to speculate on trade trends, so that movements in biofuel demand can be manipulated and magnified many times over. At the same time, monopoly control of domestic trade has ensured that a rise in international corn prices does not translate into significantly higher prices paid to small producers.

...

The Philippines provides a grim example of how neoliberal economic restructuring transforms a country from a net food exporter to a net food importer. The Philippines is the world’s largest importer of rice. Manila’s desperate effort to secure supplies at any price has become front-page news, and pictures of soldiers providing security for rice distribution in poor communities have become emblematic of the global crisis.

The broad contours of the Philippines story are similar to those of Mexico. Dictator Ferdinand Marcos was guilty of many crimes and misdeeds, including failure to follow through on land reform, but one thing he cannot be accused of is starving the agricultural sector. To head off peasant discontent, the regime provided farmers with subsidized fertilizer and seeds, launched credit plans and built rural infrastructure. When Marcos fled the country in 1986, there were 900,000 metric tons of rice in government warehouses.

Paradoxically, the next few years under the new democratic dispensation saw the gutting of government investment capacity. As in Mexico the World Bank and IMF, working on behalf of international creditors, pressured the Corazon Aquino administration to make repayment of the $26 billion foreign debt a priority. Aquino acquiesced, though she was warned by the country’s top economists that the “search for a recovery program that is consistent with a debt repayment schedule determined by our creditors is a futile one.” Between 1986 and 1993 8 percent to 10 percent of GDP left the Philippines yearly in debt-service payments — roughly the same proportion as in Mexico. Interest payments as a percentage of expenditures rose from 7 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1994; capital expenditures plunged from 26 percent to 16 percent. In short, debt servicing became the national budgetary priority.

Spending on agriculture fell by more than half. The World Bank and its local acolytes were not worried, however, since one purpose of the belt-tightening was to get the private sector to energize the countryside. But agricultural capacity quickly eroded. Irrigation stagnated, and by the end of the 1990s only 17 percent of the Philippines’ road network was paved, compared with 82 percent in Thailand and 75 percent in Malaysia. Crop yields were generally anemic, with the average rice yield way below those in China, Vietnam and Thailand, where governments actively promoted rural production. The post-Marcos agrarian reform program shriveled, deprived of funding for support services, which had been the key to successful reforms in Taiwan and South Korea. As in Mexico Filipino peasants were confronted with full-scale retreat of the state as provider of comprehensive support — a role they had come to depend on.

And the cutback in agricultural programs was followed by trade liberalization, with the Philippines’ 1995 entry into the World Trade Organization having the same effect as Mexico’s joining NAFTA. WTO membership required the Philippines to eliminate quotas on all agricultural imports except rice and allow a certain amount of each commodity to enter at low tariff rates. While the country was allowed to maintain a quota on rice imports, it nevertheless had to admit the equivalent of 1 to 4 percent of domestic consumption over the next ten years. In fact, because of gravely weakened production resulting from lack of state support, the government imported much more than that to make up for shortfalls. The massive imports depressed the price of rice, discouraging farmers and keeping growth in production at a rate far below that of the country’s two top suppliers, Thailand and Vietnam.

The consequences of the Philippines’ joining the WTO barreled through the rest of its agriculture like a super-typhoon. Swamped by cheap corn imports — much of it subsidized US grain — farmers reduced land devoted to corn from 3.1 million hectares in 1993 to 2.5 million in 2000. Massive importation of chicken parts nearly killed that industry, while surges in imports destabilized the poultry, hog and vegetable industries.

During the 1994 campaign to ratify WTO membership, government economists, coached by their World Bank handlers, promised that losses in corn and other traditional crops would be more than compensated for by the new export industry of “high-value-added” crops like cut flowers, asparagus and broccoli. Little of this materialized. Nor did many of the 500,000 agricultural jobs that were supposed to be created yearly by the magic of the market; instead, agricultural employment dropped from 11.2 million in 1994 to 10.8 million in 2001.

The one-two punch of IMF-imposed adjustment and WTO-imposed trade liberalization swiftly transformed a largely self-sufficient agricultural economy into an import-dependent one as it steadily marginalized farmers.

...

A study of fourteen countries by the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization found that the levels of food imports in 1995-98 exceeded those in 1990-94. This was not surprising, since one of the main goals of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture was to open up markets in developing countries so they could absorb surplus production in the North. As then-US Agriculture Secretary John Block put it in 1986, “The idea that developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure their food security by relying on US agricultural products, which are available in most cases at lower cost.”

What Block did not say was that the lower cost of US products stemmed from subsidies, which became more massive with each passing year despite the fact that the WTO was supposed to phase them out. From $367 billion in 1995, the total amount of agricultural subsidies provided by developed-country governments rose to $388 billion in 2004. Since the late 1990s subsidies have accounted for 40 percent of the value of agricultural production in the European Union and 25 percent in the United States.

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This is not simply the erosion of national food self-sufficiency or food security but what Africanist Deborah Bryceson of Oxford calls “de-peasantization” — the phasing out of a mode of production to make the countryside a more congenial site for intensive capital accumulation. This transformation is a traumatic one for hundreds of millions of people, since peasant production is not simply an economic activity. It is an ancient way of life, a culture, which is one reason displaced or marginalized peasants in India have taken to committing suicide. In the state of Andhra Pradesh, farmer suicides rose from 233 in 1998 to 2,600 in 2002; in Maharashtra, suicides more than tripled, from 1,083 in 1995 to 3,926 in 2005. One estimate is that some 150,000 Indian farmers have taken their lives. Collapse of prices from trade liberalization and loss of control over seeds to biotech firms is part of a comprehensive problem, says global justice activist Vandana Shiva: “Under globalization, the farmer is losing her/his social, cultural, economic identity as a producer. A farmer is now a ‘consumer’ of costly seeds and costly chemicals sold by powerful global corporations through powerful landlords and money lenders locally.”

...

At the time of decolonization, in the 1960s, Africa was actually a net food exporter. Today the continent imports 25 percent of its food; almost every country is a net importer. Hunger and famine have become recurrent phenomena, with the past three years alone seeing food emergencies break out in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and Southern and Central Africa.

Agriculture in Africa is in deep crisis, and the causes range from wars to bad governance, lack of agricultural technology and the spread of HIV/AIDS. However, as in Mexico and the Philippines, an important part of the explanation is the phasing out of government controls and support mechanisms under the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs imposed as the price for assistance in servicing external debt.

...

The support that African governments were allowed to muster was channeled by the World Bank toward export agriculture to generate foreign exchange, which states needed to service debt. But, as in Ethiopia during the 1980s famine, this led to the dedication of good land to export crops, with food crops forced into less suitable soil, thus exacerbating food insecurity. Moreover, the World Bank’s encouragement of several economies to focus on the same export crops often led to overproduction, triggering price collapses in international markets. For instance, the very success of Ghana’s expansion of cocoa production triggered a 48 percent drop in the international price between 1986 and 1989. In 2002-03 a collapse in coffee prices contributed to another food emergency in Ethiopia.

As in Mexico and the Philippines, structural adjustment in Africa was not simply about underinvestment but state divestment. But there was one major difference. In Africa the World Bank and IMF micromanaged, making decisions on how fast subsidies should be phased out, how many civil servants had to be fired and even, as in the case of Malawi, how much of the country’s grain reserve should be sold and to whom.

Compounding the negative impact of adjustment were unfair EU and US trade practices. Liberalization allowed subsidized EU beef to drive many West African and South African cattle raisers to ruin. With their subsidies legitimized by the WTO, US growers offloaded cotton on world markets at 20 percent to 55 percent of production cost, thereby bankrupting West and Central African farmers.

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In 1999 the government of Malawi initiated a program to give each smallholder family a starter pack of free fertilizers and seeds. The result was a national surplus of corn. What came after is a story that should be enshrined as a classic case study of one of the greatest blunders of neoliberal economics. The World Bank and other aid donors forced the scaling down and eventual scrapping of the program, arguing that the subsidy distorted trade. Without the free packs, output plummeted. In the meantime, the IMF insisted that the government sell off a large portion of its grain reserves to enable the food reserve agency to settle its commercial debts. The government complied. When the food crisis turned into a famine in 2001-02, there were hardly any reserves left. About 1,500 people perished. The IMF was unrepentant; in fact, it suspended its disbursements on an adjustment program on the grounds that “the parastatal sector will continue to pose risks to the successful implementation of the 2002/03 budget. Government interventions in the food and other agricultural markets… [are] crowding out more productive spending.”

By the time an even worse food crisis developed in 2005, the government had had enough of World Bank/IMF stupidity. A new president reintroduced the fertilizer subsidy, enabling 2 million households to buy it at a third of the retail price and seeds at a discount. The result: bumper harvests for two years, a million-ton maize surplus and the country transformed into a supplier of corn to Southern Africa.

Malawi’s defiance of the World Bank would probably have been an act of heroic but futile resistance a decade ago. The environment is different today, since structural adjustment has been discredited throughout Africa. Even some donor governments and NGOs that used to subscribe to it have distanced themselves from the Bank. Perhaps the motivation is to prevent their influence in the continent from being further eroded by association with a failed approach and unpopular institutions when Chinese aid is emerging as an alternative to World Bank, IMF and Western government aid programs.

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It is not only defiance from governments like Malawi and dissent from their erstwhile allies that are undermining the IMF and the World Bank. Peasant organizations around the world have become increasingly militant in their resistance to the globalization of industrial agriculture. Indeed, it is because of pressure from farmers’ groups that the governments of the South have refused to grant wider access to their agricultural markets and demanded a massive slashing of US and EU agricultural subsidies, which brought the WTO’s Doha Round of negotiations to a standstill.

Farmers’ groups have networked internationally; one of the most dynamic to emerge is Via Campesina (Peasant’s Path). Via not only seeks to get “WTO out of agriculture” and opposes the paradigm of a globalized capitalist industrial agriculture; it also proposes an alternative — food sovereignty. Food sovereignty means, first of all, the right of a country to determine its production and consumption of food and the exemption of agriculture from global trade regimes like that of the WTO. It also means consolidation of a smallholder-centered agriculture via protection of the domestic market from low-priced imports; remunerative prices for farmers and fisherfolk; abolition of all direct and indirect export subsidies; and the phasing out of domestic subsidies that promote unsustainable agriculture. Via’s platform also calls for an end to the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights regime, or TRIPs, which allows corporations to patent plant seeds; opposes agro-technology based on genetic engineering; and demands land reform. In contrast to an integrated global monoculture, Via offers the vision of an international agricultural economy composed of diverse national agricultural economies trading with one another but focused primarily on domestic production.

Walden Bello is senior analyst at and former executive director of Focus on the Global South, a research and advocacy institute based at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. He is the author or co-author of many books on politics and economic issues in the Philippines and Asia, including, most recently, Deglobalization (Zed), and recipient of the 2003 Right Livelihood Award, also known as the “Alternative Nobel Prize.” In March he was named Outstanding Public Scholar for 2008 by the International Studies Association.

HT: Economist's View

Kevin Phillips: Numbers Racket: Why the Economy is Worse Than We Know

Kevin Phillips, author of American Theocracy (a book I endorse), has an article in Harper's Magazine about the fudging of economic data by the American government. The problem, according to Phillips, apparently began with the Kennedy administration and has continued on an erratic basis through to the present day, with the guilt being shared by both Democratic and Republican administrations. The first third of the article documents how the Consumer Price Index (CPI), unemployment statistics, and the gross domestic product (GDP) numbers have all been manipulated over the decades, not necessarily out of some grand conspiratorial plot, but out of "accumulating opportunisms."


Sources: John Williams, ShadowStats.com, U.S. Bureau of Labor

The second third of the article looks a little more deeply at the opacity that has developed over the three economic statistics mentioned above:

Of the "big three" statistics, let us start with unemployment. Most of the people tired of looking for work, as mentioned above, are no longer counted in the workforce, though they do still show up in one of the auxiliary unemployment numbers. The BLS has six different regular jobless measurements—U-1, U-2, U-3 (the one routinely cited), U-4, U-5, and U-6. In January 2008, the U-4 to U-6 series produced unemployment numbers ranging from 5.2 percent to 9.0 percent, all above the "official" number. The series nearest to real-world conditions is, not surprisingly, the highest: U-6, which includes part-timers looking for full-time employment as well as other members of the "marginally attached," a new catchall meaning those not looking for a job but who say they want one. Yet this does not even include the Americans who (as Austan Goolsbee puts it) have been "bought off the unemployment rolls" by government programs such as Social Security disability, whose recipients are classified as outside the labor force.

Second is the Gross Domestic Product, which in itself represents something of a fudge: federal economists used the Gross National Product until 1991, when rising U.S. international debt costs made the narrower GDP assessment more palatable. The GDP has been subject to many further fiddles, the most manipulatable of which are the adjustments made for the presumed starting up and ending of businesses (the "birth/death of businesses" equation) and the amounts that the Bureau of Economic Analysis "imputes" to nationwide personal income data (known as phantom income boosters, or imputations; for example, the imputed income from living in one's own home, or the benefit one receives from a free checking account, or the value of employer-paid health-and-life-insurance premiums). During 2007, believe it or not, imputed income accounted for some 15 percent of GDP. John Williams, the economic statistician, is briskly contemptuous of GDP numbers over the past quarter century. "Upward growth biases built into GDP modeling since the early 1980s have rendered this important series nearly worthless," he wrote in 2004. "[T]he recessions of 1990/1991 and 2001 were much longer and deeper than currently reported [and] lesser downturns in 1986 and 1995 were missed completely."

Nothing, however, can match the tortured evolution of the third key number, the somewhat misnamed Consumer Price Index. Government economists themselves admit that the revisions during the Clinton years worked to reduce the current inflation figures by more than a percentage point, but the overall distortion has been considerably more severe. Just the 1983 manipulation, which substituted "owner equivalent rent" for home-ownership costs, served to understate or reduce inflation during the recent housing boom by 3 to 4 percentage points. Moreover, since the 1990s, the CPI has been subjected to three other adjustments, all downward and all dubious: product substitution (if flank steak gets too expensive, people are assumed to shift to hamburger, but nobody is assumed to move up to filet mignon), geometric weighting (goods and services in which costs are rising most rapidly get a lower weighting for a presumed reduction in consumption), and, most bizarrely, hedonic adjustment, an unusual computation by which additional quality is attributed to a product or service.

...

"All in all," Williams points out, "if you were to peel back changes that were made in the CPI going back to the Carter years, you'd see that the CPI would now be 3.5 percent to 4 percent higher"—meaning that, because of lost CPI increases, Social Security checks would be 70 percent greater than they currently are.

Furthermore, when discussing price pressure, government officials invariably bring up "core" inflation, which excludes precisely the two categories—food and energy—now verging on another 1970s-style price surge. This year we have already seen major U.S. food and grocery companies, among them Kellogg and Kraft, report sharp declines in earnings caused by rising grain and dairy prices. Central banks from Europe to Japan worry that the biggest inflation jumps in ten to fifteen years could get in the way of reducing interest rates to cope with weakening economies. Even the U.S. Labor Department acknowledged that in January, the price of imported goods had increased 13.7 percent compared with a year earlier, the biggest surge since record-keeping began in 1982. From Maine to Australia, from Alaska to the Middle East, a hydra-headed inflation is on the loose, unleashed by the many years of rapid growth in the supply of money from the world's central banks (not least the U.S. Federal Reserve), as well as by massive public and private debt creation.

U.S. Unemployment Rates:
Red - Including workers who are part-time for "economic reasons"
Yellow - Including other "marginally attached" workers
Blue - Including "discouraged" workers
Black - The official "unemployment rate"

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The last third of the article sums up the numerous economic problems the U.S. is currently facing:

The real numbers, to most economically minded Americans, would be a face full of cold water. Based on the criteria in place a quarter century ago, today's U.S. unemployment rate is somewhere between 9 percent and 12 percent; the inflation rate is as high as 7 or even 10 percent; economic growth since the recession of 2001 has been mediocre, despite a huge surge in the wealth and incomes of the superrich, and we are falling back into recession. If what we have been sold in recent years has been delusional "Pollyanna Creep," what we really need today is a picture of our economy ex-distortion. For what it would reveal is a nation in deep difficulty not just domestically but globally.

Undermeasurement of inflation, in particular, hangs over our heads like a guillotine. To acknowledge it would send interest rates climbing, and thereby would endanger the viability of the massive buildup of public and private debt (from less than $11 trillion in 1987 to $49 trillion last year) that props up the American economy. Moreover, the rising cost of pensions, benefits, borrowing, and interest payments—all indexed or related to inflation—could join with the cost of financial bailouts to overwhelm the federal budget. As inflation and interest rates have been kept artificially suppressed, the United States has been indentured to its volatile financial sector, with its predilection for leverage and risky buccaneering.

Arguably, the unraveling has already begun. As Robert Hardaway, a professor at the University of Denver, pointed out last September, the subprime lending crisis "can be directly traced back to the [1983] BLS decision to exclude the price of housing from the CPI. . .With the illusion of low inflation inducing lenders to offer 6 percent loans, not only has speculation run rampant on the expectations of ever-rising home prices, but home buyers by the millions have been tricked into buying homes even though they only qualified for the teaser rates." Were mainstream interest rates to jump into the 7 to 9 percent range—which could happen if inflation were to spur new concern—both Washington and Wall Street would be walking in quicksand. The make-believe economy of the past two decades, with its asset bubbles, massive borrowing, and rampant data distortion, would be in serious jeopardy. The U.S. dollar, off more than 40 percent against the euro since 2002, could slip down an even rockier slope.

The credit markets are fearful, and the financial markets are nervous. If gloom continues, our humbugged nation may truly regret losing sight of history, risk, and common sense.

HT: Economist's View

Answering George on Low Birth Rates in the West

George Carty has (once again) asked an interesting question, this time in response to my Straight Talk About Islam post:

About the birth rates thing - do you think that environmentalist propaganda about "overpopulation" has anything to do with low birth rates in the West?

For a number of years, I've argued that declining birth rates more often had to do with increasing standards of living. The higher the standard of living, the lower the birth rate. I had argued that this could be seen as far back as the era of Augustus, with his introduction of laws such as the Lex Papia Poppaea, which penalized the celibate and childless, especially among Rome's patrician class.

Caesar Augustus encouraged marriage and having children. He assessed heavier taxes on unmarried men and women and, by contrast, offered rewards for marriage and child bearing. Since there were more males than females among the nobility, he permitted that anyone who wished (except for senators) to marry freedwomen could do so, and decreed the children of these marriages to be legitimate, (Suetonius). (Source)

And so I did a quick-and-dirty analysis using data from the CIA World Factbook to see just how true this proposal might be. Using GDP per capita on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis as a proxy to measure the standard of living, I compared that statistic against total fertility rates for a total of 221 countries. A graph of the data points can be seen below:


On the X-axis we have the total fertility rates with a minimum of 1.00 (Hong Kong) and a maximum of 7.34 (Mali). On the Y-axis we have GDP per capita. If my idea is correct we should expect to find the numbers running from the top-left to the bottom-right. We do see this somewhat, although with a lot of data points in the lower left corner (low total fertility rates and low GDP per capita). If my original idea was correct, the correlation coefficient, which measures the strength and direction of two sets of related data, would be close to negative 1, which indicates a perfectly negative relationship between the two data sets (in other words, the higher one set of data is, the lower the other data set is). Here, the correlation coefficient is negative 0.4854. So there is a negative relationship, but of middling strength.

I also remembered seeing some statistics before showing that countries with low life expectancies often had high birth rates. (If you know that you're likely to die at a young age, you're not likely to wait around until your thirties or forties before having kids, like in Western cultures.) So I took the total fertility rates and compared it against the life expectancies at birth, also for 221 countries. The graph can be seen below:


Now here is a more negative relationship that's much more clearly defined. The correlation coefficient confirms this, being at negative 0.7678, which is much stronger than the correlation coefficient for GDP. In other words, the longer people live, the less likely they are to have children. This is perhaps more of a reflection of a country's ability to provide better health care to their citizens: the better a country's health care, the lower the country's population growth rate. However, there are exceptions to this rule as well. For example, some of the countries with higher life expectancies and total fertility rates tend to be Muslim countries, like Oman (73.91 years; 5.62 babies/woman) and the Gaza Strip (72.34 years; 5.51 babies/woman). Likewise, there are some countries who have both low birth rates and low life expectancies. But, overall, life expectancy seems to be a better explanation why Western cultures have lower birth rates, at least in comparison to standard of living. (There are a couple of other analyses that could be done as well; e.g., life expectancy of men vs. women, and multiple regression analysis of GDP per capita and life expectancy vs. total fertility rates, but I'll save those for the future, insha'allah.)

And, obviously, to answer George's original question, no, I don't think overpopulation has much to do with Western birth rates, although that could be an analysis for another day.

The Economist: Bernanke's Bind

An important article in this week's Economist. As I had first pointed out a couple weeks ago on my new blog, part of the reason for the rising inflation in commodity prices, such as oil and rice has been due to the combination of dollar-denominated commodity prices and a weakening U.S. dollar; i.e., as the dollar weakens against other currencies, this causes the prices for commodities to rise in order to maintain value. (For you non-Econogeeks out there, this is what is known as "purchasing power parity." A McDonald's Big Mac here in Singapore is the same as a Big Mac in the U.S., and the exchange rate between the Singapore and U.S. dollars should be such that you would pay the same amount for the same product (the Big Mac) regardless of what currency you're using.)

The other major problem is that, as interest rates keep going down (as they did again last week), the real value of the interest rate goes into negative territory. The real interest rate is (essentially) the nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation. With this negative real interest rate, commodity producers such as farmers, miners, oilers, etc., have more incentive not to sell their products, even though this hurts them in the short-term by not bringing in revenue. As a a result, the amount of supply is lowered, which, in turn, raises prices.

There is another problem mentioned in the final paragraph below; however, the primary argument remains that the Federal Reserve must take some share of the blame for rising commodity prices, whether it's oil or agricultural products, due to their continued lowering of interest rates. This argument suggests, then, that commodity prices might not begin to drop until the U.S. dollar starts to strengthen.

An excerpt from the article:

But oil—and other commodities—are the crux of the problem. In the past, economic weakness in America has usually pushed the price of oil and other commodities down. That relationship has weakened thanks to demand growth in big commodity-intensive emerging economies. But the recent surprise is that commodity prices have soared even as America’s economy has stalled and forecasts for global growth have been trimmed as well. Supply shocks are clearly part of the problem. But the fact that prices have soared across so many commodities suggests a common cause.

Could the culprit be the Fed? Advocates of this idea point to two channels. First, by slashing real interest rates, the Fed has encouraged speculation in commodities by reducing the cost of holding inventories. Second, by pushing down the dollar, Fed looseness is pushing up the price of dollar-denominated commodities.

Jeff Frankel, a Harvard economist, has long argued that low real interest rates lead to higher commodity prices. When real rates fall, he points out, commodity producers have more incentive to keep their asset—whether crude oil, gold or grain—in the ground or in a silo, than to sell today. Speculators, in turn, have more incentive to shift into commodities. There is no doubt that commodities have become an increasingly popular investment category—in fact they bear many of the hallmarks of a speculative bubble. But inventories for many commodities, particularly grains, are unusually low.

What about the dollar link? Chakib Khelil, president of the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, argued this week that oil could reach $200 a barrel largely because the market was being driven by the dollar’s slide. Movements in the euro/dollar exchange rate and the price of oil have become extremely close (see chart). An analysis by Jens Nordvig and Jeffrey Currie of Goldman Sachs shows that the correlation between weekly changes in the oil price and the euro/dollar exchange rate has risen from 1% between 1999 and 2004 to 52% in the past six months.

That link is partly a matter of accounting. If the dollar falls, the dollar price of a commodity must rise for its overall price—in terms of a basket of global currencies—to remain stable. But commodity prices have risen even when priced in non-dollar currencies. And the correlation between changes in the price of oil and the euro/dollar exchange rate has risen even when oil is priced in a basket of currencies, such as the IMF’s special drawing rights.

So is the weaker dollar driving oil prices up or are high oil prices driving the dollar down? The Goldman analysts argue the latter because oil exporters import more from Europe than America and hold less of their oil revenues in dollars. A second factor lies with central banks. Because the Fed focuses on “core” inflation (which excludes food and fuel), whereas the ECB targets overall inflation, America’s central bank runs a looser policy in response to higher oil prices, thus pushing the dollar down.

Another reason to suspect that the Fed is more than a bit player is that American interest-rate decisions have a disproportionate effect on global monetary conditions. Some emerging economies still peg their currencies to the dollar; many others have been reluctant to let their exchange rates rise enough to make up for the dollar’s decline. As a result, monetary conditions in many emerging markets remain too loose. This fuels domestic demand, pushing up pressure on prices, particularly of commodities. All of which suggests that the Fed’s decisions are propagated widely through the dollar.

Originally posted at Dunner's.